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Abstract
Geomasking is used to provide privacy protection for individual address information while
maintaining spatial resolution for mapping purposes. Donut geomasking and other random
perturbation geomasking algorithms rely on the assumption of a homogeneously distributed
population to calculate displacement distances, leading to possible under-protection of individuals
when this condition is not met. Using household data from 2007, we evaluated the performance of
donut geomasking in Orange County, North Carolina. We calculated the estimated k-anonymity for
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the actual k-anonymity by revealing household locations contained in the county E911 database.
Census block groups in mixed-use areas with high population distribution heterogeneity were the
most likely to have privacy protection below selected criteria. For heterogeneous populations, we
suggest tripling the minimum displacement area in the donut to protect privacy with a less than 1%
error rate.
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1. Introduction
When health researchers want to georeference study participants or reported cases of various
diseases, they can either geocode these persons using an address or aggregate them to a
geopolitical or mail sorting area, assigning them to the centroid of that area or region
(MacDorman and Gay 1999, Rushton et al. 2006). Geocoding is usually preferable for in-house
use, but depending on the source and sensitivity of the subject location and nature of the study,
may not be acceptable for sharing the data more broadly. Consequently, aggregation is often
used to preserve confidentiality (Duncan and Pearson 1991). Assigning a person to the centroid
of an area ensures that the subject is sufficiently hidden within a larger population, protecting
his or her identity. Non-spatial aggregation methods such as age and race categories have also
been utilized to keep individuals in the dataset from being identified (Sweeney 2002a).
Although aggregation protects confidentiality, it substantially degrades spatial resolution. The
higher the level of aggregation, the less effective a map will be for identifying geographical
and epidemiological trends at the local level (Boulos et al. 2006). A disease map with the
highest possible spatial resolution (i.e. showing the most detail) should be the most informative
and lead to the most efficient use of public health resources.(Cassa et al. 2006, Olson et al.
2006, Gutmann and Stern 2007). For example, identifying that county X has the highest
incidence rate of syphilis for the year 2009 is much less helpful for allocating resources for
disease control and intervention than being able to say that there appears to be a syphilis
outbreak occurring on the college campus in census block group Y in county X. Similarly, the
progression of an infection that crosses a geopolitical boundary of the corresponding
aggregation level will be obscured by moving cases to the centroid.
The importance of privacy protection for spatial information depends on several factors. One
of the most important is the disease or outcome of interest. For common diseases, such as
influenza, the need for masking the location of a patient is probably small, as the risk of privacy
compromise is small. In contrast, HIV infection is relatively rare, carries social stigmas, and
is costly to manage and treat. It is critical to sufficiently mask the locations of these cases,
because many individuals are only willing to be tested if their identity remains anonymous.
Most health outcomes fall between these two extremes (Wieland et al. 2008, Brownstein et
al. 2006).
Geomasking is a class of methods for changing the geographic location of an individual in an
unpredictable way to protect confidentiality, while trying to preserve the relationship between
geocoded locations and disease occurrence (Sherman and Fetters 2007, Wiggins 2002).
Random perturbation is one example of a method to alter the geographic location of an
individual without aggregating (Armstrong et al. 1999, Armstrong and Ruggles 2005, Kwan
et al. 2004). We have modified the basic random perturbation method to require that an
individual is moved at least a minimum distance, so that they cannot be randomly placed in
their original location, creating a donut area for possible masking locations (Stinchcomb
Allshouse et al. Page 2













2004). This has been shown to greatly improve privacy protection with a negligible effect on
the sensitivity and specificity of detecting disease clusters (Hampton et al. 2009).
Random perturbation methods (including the donut method) use the population density to
determine the distance an individual needs to be moved in order to achieve a certain level of
privacy protection. Geographic information systems (GIS) are usually used to obtain
population density estimates for the calculation and to match the proper census level, county,
or ZIP code to the subject location. However, this methodology almost always relies on the
assumption that the population density is homogeneously distributed. This condition is rarely
met and can lead to under-protection of individuals when mapping sensitive health data.
With the rapid increase in the use of GIS, many United States counties have begun to create
databases that list every geocoded residential address. The original intention was to give the
coordinate locations of every household within the county so that dispatchers can quickly route
emergency personnel to an address given during a 911 call without relying on a caller in a
stressful situation to provide the information. Thus, they are commonly referred to as E911
databases. These databases also provide important information about the distribution of
households across a spatial area.
We determined the estimated privacy protection obtained using donut geomasking under the
assumption that households are uniformly distributed within each census block group to
address potential geomasking confidentiality concerns arising when household addresses are
revealed by an E911 database and then calculated the actual privacy protection based on
household addresses in such a database. We provide an approximate correction factor that
anticipates the loss of privacy protection that may occur when household addresses are revealed
by comparing the estimated privacy protection with the actual privacy protection achieved.
2. Methods
2.1 E911 Database and GIS Data Sets
We obtained the most recent version of the Orange County, North Carolina E911 database
(Orange County GIS Division 2007). This county was chosen because its E911 data were
readily available and it contains census block groups with a variety of population densities.
Orange County includes the city of Chapel Hill with several areas of high density student
housing and apartment complexes, the small town of Hillsborough, and a significant percentage
of low density rural land.
The Orange County E911 data is formatted as a GIS spatial data set that includes every
identified residential unit in the county. For example, an apartment complex with 200 units
would be identified as 200 points representing the centroids of the individual apartment units.
Ideally, such a database would include every housing unit within the county, but new
construction may not always be reflected in the database. The current database includes the
coordinates of 62,675 households in the county (Figure 1). We also obtained the 2007 Orange
County census block group spatial data set, which is based on the 2000 census, with
demographic information projected for the year 2007. The E911 and census block group data
sets were linked using ESRI's ArcMap Version 9.3.
We calculated the number of households from the E911 database within each census block
group. Although in most situations, geomasking algorithms would use the population and area
of the census block group, we used household density, because the E911 file has household
locations (not locations of individuals). We substituted the number of households in a block
group for the population of that block group in this simulation.
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Each of the 62,675 households (i) in Orange County was donut geomasked by moving its
geocoded location in a random direction by more than a specified minimum distance (Rai), but
less than a maximum distance (Rbi), while remaining in its original census block group (Figure
2). This census level was chosen because we believe that it provides the optimal balance of
anonymity while maintaining spatial resolution of the subject locations. Also, it is smallest
geographical unit for which the detailed long-form census data are available (starting with the
2010 Census, the decennial long form data collection will be replaced bv the continuously-
updated American Community Survey). The distance of displacement for a given household
is randomly selected between the lower and upper bounds Rai and Rbi that are dependent on
the number of households (Ni) and area (Ai) of the census block group where that household
resides (Eqs 1a and 1b).
(1a)
(1b)
The parameters ka and kb are chosen by the user so that by assuming a homogeneous household
density across the census block group, the subject will be displaced by a minimum of ka
households and a maximum of kb households. If the geomasked household is placed outside
of its original census block group, the algorithm is rerun until the household falls into its original
census block group.
Multiple runs of the donut geomasking simulation were conducted varying the parameter ka
for each run. The parameter kb was maintained at 10*ka. For this simulation we used ka=5, 10,
15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 60, and 75 households.
2.3 K-Anonymity
We determined the privacy protection offered by the geomask using the concept of k-
anonymity as the measure of success. K-anonymity is defined as the number of households
from whom a de-identified subject cannot be distinguished. Spatially, this measure is simply
the number of households closer to the original location than the distance of displacement for
the geomask. It can be illustrated as the number of households within a circle whose centroid
is the original household location and radius is the Euclidean distance between the original and
masked locations (Sweeney 2002b).
After the households were donut geomasked for a given value of ka and kb, the estimated and
actual k-anonymity were determined for each of the 62,675 locations. The estimated k-
anonymity for a location i was calculated as:
(2)
where Di is the Euclidean distance between the original location and the masked location and
Ai and Ni are the area and number of households, respectively, of the corresponding census
block group. This value for k-anonymity gives an estimated measure of privacy protection
based on the assumption that the census block groups' households are uniformly distributed.
The actual k-anonymity for each location (kact,i) was defined as the number of households from
the E911 file that were closer to the original location than the distance of displacement. As its
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name suggests, the actual k-anonymity measures the actual level of confidentiality achieved
by the masking algorithm once the locations of households in the E911 database are revealed.
2.4 Evaluation
Often the estimated k-anonymity is used to claim a certain level of privacy protection when
information regarding actual household locations is unavailable. Since we have the actual
household locations for Orange County, we evaluated how well that kest, based on a uniform
household distribution assumption, serves as a proxy for kact, based on the actual E911
household locations.
The analysis focuses on the percentage of households across the county that did not achieve
kact,i≥Kmin in order to illustrate the overall failure of the geomasking method with parameters
ka and kb to achieve the desired level of privacy protection. The decision of an acceptable value
for Kmin, which is defined as the smallest value for actual k-anonymity that is acceptable, must
be chosen by the user to ensure adequate privacy protection for a given study situation, taking
into account things such as the disease, study area, and privacy factors.
For a given ka and kb, we made comparisons among the census block groups to assess how the
method performed across areas with differing household densities. As the parameters ka and
kb increase, we describe the changing geographic pattern of census block groups' percentage
of households unable to meet the privacy protection criterion kact, i≥Kmin, i.e. we evaluate the
relationship between ka (and kb) and the rate of kact, i<Kmin.
We used Kmin=5 as our minimum acceptable actual k-anonymity in the simulations presented
here. We are not recommending this particular choice, but use it for illustration as other values
of Kmin should reveal a similar relationship among ka, kb, and the percentage of households
that do not meet the Kmin standard. Additional simulations with Kmin > 5 yielded similar results.
Given our use of Kmin = 5 as our standard, we initiated our simulations with ka = 5 (kb = 50).
In theory, with ka = 5, all census block groups would meet our minimum privacy protection
standard under the assumption of homogeneous household distribution. Households with
kact,i < 5 would indicate a failure of that assumption. Increasing ka should be associated with
fewer failures given the use of a constant Kmin.
3. Results
The first run of the geomasking simulation used the parameters ka=5 and kb=50, so that if the
assumption of a homogeneous distribution of households is correct, every household should
be displaced by at least 5 additional households. Across the census block groups, the percentage
of households with an actual k-anonymity less than 5 varied from 1.5% to 7.5%. The 5 block
groups in the highest quintile (worst-performing) were all close to the city of Chapel Hill with
4 of the 5 located in the northern section of the city. This particular section of town is the
location of several large apartment complexes intermingled with single-family houses and
forested land, creating substantial heterogeneity in the household distribution.
When the parameters ka and kb were changed to 10 and 100 respectively, the proportion of
households with violations of Kmin < 5 decreases. All census block groups had less than 2.5%
of their households violating the standard of actual k-anonymity less than 5. Furthermore, the
relative privacy protection for census groups varied substantially, as compared to the initial set
of parameters. None of the five worst-performing block groups that were located around Chapel
Hill remained in the worst quintile during the second run. The worst performing areas moved
to western Hillsborough (in the central part of the county) and southwestern Chapel Hill.
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The user-defined minimum and maximum parameters, ka and kb, were increased to 15 and 150
for the third simulation. Using this masking procedure, the majority of census block groups
had less than 1% of their households with an actual k-anonymity less than 5, with only 340
households (0.54%) across Orange County not achieving the standard. The census block groups
in the highest quintiles tend to appear around the outskirts of Hillsborough and Chapel Hill.
These block groups often appear to have widely varying household densities from one area of
the block group to another.
As the ka parameter increases to greater than 3*Kmin, a pattern for block groups violating
Kmin becomes less discernable. All but 15 of the county's block groups had every household
adequately protected with ka=20 and kb=200. The geographical pattern of the mapped quintiles
shows only small changes from the previous run with the notable exception that a block group
in southeastern Chapel Hill switched from the highest quintile of violation percentage when
masking with ka=15 and kb=150 to having zero violations using the largest parameters. Overall,
the worst performing blocks groups still tended to be those situated between a city and rural
land.
Evaluating a map to find where cases are not adequately protected can help inform a researcher
with a strong knowledge of the study area as to why the assumption that households are
distributed homogeneously is inadequate. However, often the researcher does not know how
households or people are distributed across a various study area and simply needs to correct
for the assumption of homogeneity.
As we varied the minimum acceptable k-anonymity so that Kmin=10, 15, 20, and 25, a pattern
in the percentage of violations across the county begins to take shape. In each instance,
approximately 99.5% of the households achieve the privacy standard when ka=3*Kmin. Further
increases in ka make fairly minimal gains in privacy protection at a continued (nearly linear)
loss of spatial resolution (Table 1). Multiplying by a factor of three can help to correct for the
homogeneity assumption when the actual locations of households are unavailable.
4. Discussion
As the use of GIS has become more available to a variety of users, research involving health
and disease mapping has risen as well. When the data are available at the address level,
balancing individual privacy protection versus the spatial resolution of the map is an important
initial consideration that should depend on several factors including the disease or infection
being mapped.
Aggregating data has often been used to protect the individual in a database, but this method
substantially reduces the resolution of the data available to the researcher. Random perturbation
geomasks are desirable because the random component prevents one from back-transforming
the process to find the original location. We prefer to use the donut method of random
perturbation because it provides additional privacy protection for the individual with a
negligible loss in sensitivity and specificity for detecting disease clusters (Hampton et al.
2009). Also, due to the minimum distance requirement, a subject cannot be randomly placed
in its original location. This can be especially helpful in an area of the census block group
where the household density is less than the mean. Finally, by assuring that the subject stays
in its original census block group, the neighborhood demographic and socio-economic
information assigned to the masked subject is relevant to the unknown original location.
Our geomasking simulation utilized households in place of persons for determining the distance
of displacement and to calculate the estimated and actual k-anonymity. In the majority of real
world situations, individual persons would be the basis of these calculations because
individuals (not households) contract disease and the most readily available census statistics
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are produced for individuals. Across the United States, the average of 2.0 persons per household
is fairly consistent. Therefore, we believe that using households as a proxy for individuals is
a reasonable thing to do. However, using individuals should create even more heterogeneity
in the population distribution because they are confined to the locations of the households. In
other words, the people cannot be more evenly distributed than the households if you make the
assumption that a person must live in an available household (discounting the fact that people
could be homeless, etc.). Therefore, one might want to increase the displacement parameters
to account for using individuals instead of households.
We used the census block group level to enhance the likelihood of adequate privacy protection.
The average population of a block for census year 2000 in the state of North Carolina was only
34.5, making it insufficient for hiding cases. The census block group level, which had a mean
population greater than 5,000, offered a large enough population to mask the subject and can
always be upscaled to the census tract and county level. Using the smallest feasible unit (block
group) is also desirable because the population density estimate used for calculating the
distance of displacement should be more accurate on average since it is based on a smaller
geographical area. ZIP codes do not necessarily correspond to census or county boundaries,
reducing their desirability for geomasking algorithms.
We elected to keep the ratio of kb=10*ka constant simply to reduce the possible combinations
of parameters to evaluate. In an actual spatial epidemiological application, the value for the
inner radius of the donut should be carefully considered as the choice for the minimum amount
of protection that is acceptable. The value for the outer donut should be viewed with regards
to the maximum amount of spatial distortion acceptable. While the lower limit of ka is debatable
with regards to how much protection is enough, the upper limit of kb is bounded by the fact
that too much distortion approaches aggregation in mapping resolution, negating the benefits
of the donut geomasking method. Additionally, while the upper bound for kb can be made
infinite, the number of people contained in a census block group places its own bound on this
parameter. For example, if kb is set to 10,000 and there are only 1,000 in the block group, the
largest kact achievable is 1,000, due to the constraint that a subject must be geomasked within
the same census block group.
Using a factor less than 10 should mean that a larger adjustment needs to be made to correct
for population heterogeneity. A factor greater than 10 should need less of a correction because
as the size of the area in the donut grows, the population density within the donut area should
approach that of the respective census block group. For the same reason, our constraint that
the subject must be masked within their census block group increases the need to correct for
heterogeneity because the donut area is effectively reduced.
K-anonymity was chosen as the measure of privacy protection because it has been defined and
referenced in other peer-reviewed research articles. However, it is a little misleading because
one must know the original and masked location to calculate it. Under normal circumstances,
only the masked location will be available. Given that the randomly generated distance and
direction are unknown, and typically the masking parameters are unknown as well, the overall
protection provided by our method is greater than the number calculated as the k-anonymity.
The donut geomasking method described in this paper makes the assumption that the masked
coordinates of subjects is the only information available. Typically, health databases will also
include other variables for the subjects such as sex, age, and race. The donut method can easily
be adapted to account for these other factors. Since demographic information is available in
the block group spatial data sets from the census, the number of people (or households in this
simulation) in the distance of displacement calculation can simply be replaced by the number
of people in the same age/sex/race category of the subject's respective census block group.
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The tradeoff between the degree of protection and level of spatial detail depends on factors
including the disease and concerns for patient confidentiality. Therefore, we provide a table
showing the results for different levels of privacy protection for a given ka and kb, so that one
can choose the level of confidentiality that works for their particular situation. As a general
guideline, we suggest tripling the parameters ka and kb to help account for the heterogeneity
in the population distribution across a given census block group. Our simulation consistently
showed that 3*ka led to >99% of households having kact ≥ka.
If one is geomasking within the census block group, a rough measure of population
heterogeneity can easily be obtained by calculating the variance of population density in the
blocks that make up a block group. A low variance means that kest will more closely
approximate kact. A high variance should lead one to choose more conservative parameters for
the donut geomasking.
One of the limitations of this research is the fact that we only geomasked households in Orange
County, North Carolina. We believe that this county was a reasonable choice because it contains
a variety of population densities across its 56 census block groups that range from 40–17,000
persons/mi2, with heterogeneity in population distribution among and within block groups.
Also, since this is the location for the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, our
familiarity with the area helped inform conclusions regarding the simulation.
Orange County does not contain any large cities and it's possible that results could be different
for a large urban area. For example, a census block group in a major urban area could contain
high density residential units close to business or industrial areas with very few residential
units, causing an even greater contrast in population heterogeneity than what we found.
However, since large cities are often planned in a grid-like fashion, there is a high likelihood
that they would more closely approximate a uniform population distribution than Orange
County.
There has recently been a large increase in demand for mapping health outcomes in order to
distinguish spatial patterns, correlate with environmental factors, and control outbreaks. As
more GIS databases are created and made available to the public, it is critical to ensure that
data from those patients in sensitive health databases remain protected and confidential
throughout the research process.
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The locations of all households in Orange County, NC according to the 2007 E911 database.
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Each household is geomasked by a random direction and distance, where the distance Di must
fall within the donut created by radii Rai and Rbi The geomasked household must also reside
in its original census block group so that neighborhood demographic and socio-economic
factors for the masked location are the same as the original location.
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